In September 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, calling for the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the extension of Lebanese government authority throughout the country. Twenty-two years later, Hezbollah remains an armed organization operating outside the full control of the Lebanese state. The question is no longer whether Lebanon needs another international resolution. It is why the resolutions already adopted have failed to achieve their objectives, and what must change for Lebanon to finally exercise authority over its own territory.
Resolution 1559 was not the first attempt to address the question of armed groups in Lebanon. The 1989 Taif Agreement, which helped bring an end to Lebanon's civil war, also called for the disbandment of militias and the restoration of state authority. While many militias eventually surrendered their weapons or integrated into Lebanon's political system, Hezbollah retained its military capabilities, initially justifying them as necessary to resist Israeli occupation. Israel withdrew from most of southern Lebanon in 2000, although territorial disputes remained. Hezbollah continued to maintain its weapons, arguing that they were necessary to defend Lebanon against future Israeli aggression.
Following the devastating 2006 war, which began after Hezbollah launched a cross-border attack against Israeli soldiers, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701. The resolution called for the cessation of hostilities and established a framework under which southern Lebanon would be free of unauthorized armed groups and weapons. Yet the central issue remained unresolved. Hezbollah continued to develop its military capabilities.
Over time, with a lot of financial and military support from Iran, Hezbollah developed an armed force that surpassed the Lebanese Armed Forces in significant military capabilities. This created a difficult situation in Lebanon, where a political organization had the military power to make decisions of war and peace outside the authority of the Lebanese state.
The consequences became particularly clear in October 2023, when Hezbollah began launching attacks across Lebanon's southern border following Hamas's October 7 attack on Israel. The confrontation escalated into a devastating conflict in 2024, causing thousands of deaths, widespread displacement, and enormous damage to Lebanese infrastructure. The World Bank estimated Lebanon's reconstruction and recovery needs following the conflict at approximately $11 billion. The Lebanese people were left confronting the consequences of a war they had not authorized through their national institutions.
Hezbollah has long argued that Israeli military operations and the continued occupation of Lebanese territory make its weapons necessary. To be fair, Israel’s continued military presence in parts of southern Lebanon, and its ongoing strikes have violated Lebanese sovereignty and complicated negotiations. However, these are matters that should be addressed by the Lebanese government and its elected representatives, not by an armed political organization acting independently of the state.
The approaching withdrawal of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon presents another serious challenge. Under Security Council Resolution 2790, UNIFIL's mandate will end on December 31, 2026, followed by an orderly withdrawal process lasting up to one year. The mission has operated in southern Lebanon since 1978. Although its effectiveness has been repeatedly questioned, it has played a role in monitoring hostilities, supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, and maintaining communication between parties.
Its departure raises a difficult question: Is the Lebanese state prepared to assume full security responsibility in the south?
In October, the European Union agreed to establish a three-year support mission to strengthen Lebanon's army and security forces. The United States has also played a significant role, providing more than $3 billion in military assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces since 2006. More recently, the Trump administration approved $230 million in security assistance in 2025, including $190 million for the Lebanese Armed Forces and $40 million for the Internal Security Forces. An additional $50 million was made available for the Lebanese Armed Forces under the 2026 U.S. defense appropriations law.
While this international support is important, funding, training, and equipment alone cannot solve Lebanon's security challenges. The Lebanese government must also have the political authority and willingness to enforce its laws and ensure that no armed organization operates outside the control of the state, even if doing so means confronting Hezbollah's resistance to disarmament.
For the Amer Foundation, this issue goes beyond military and political arrangements. When armed organizations operate beyond the authority of the state, the ability to investigate abuses, hold perpetrators accountable, and protect fundamental rights becomes severely compromised as we have seen in Amer Fakhoury’s case. Lebanon cannot build a future in which its citizens enjoy equal protection under the law while competing centers of military power continue to exist.